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Integrated theaterised command for the Indian Armed Forces

发布时间:2017-03-26
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1

REQUIREMENT OF EVOLVING INTEGRATED THEATERISED COMMAND FOR THE INDIAN ARMED FORCES

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

“The only impediment towards achieving true jointmanship is only attitude; combined with a sense of insecurity; whereby the services fear that their individual identity and functional autonomy will be compromised, because a particular service, will simply overshadow the other two services.”

- Guilio Douhet, Italian General & Air Power Theorist

  1. Modern war fighting requires a common frame of reference within which operations on land, sea, below water and in the air must be integrated and synergised. A victory in future war is possible only with the optimal integration of all the forces committed towards the defence of the mother land.
  2. Technology is now dictating the need for fast dissemination of information into actions which can be implemented, often simultaneously from several directions and by several forces and equally fast reassessment and re-ordering of tasks and resources. The Indian armed forces are presently operating as three distinct branches namely the Army, Navy and Air Force. However, the optimal utilisation of all the forces in all the dimensions of warfare is only feasible in a unified command structure in a particular theatre of operation.
  3. In any service, the commanders would be focussed towards the achievement of the mission objectives as per their individual perception of the service oriented tasks. However, the scope and coordination of the joint operations to achieve the national objectives may be lost out. The narrow focus of each service hampers the inter service communication and interaction.
  4. In view of the above stated factors, the defence forces should operate and train as an integrated force rather than piece meal forces. Hence, Indian defence forces needs to be evolved for optimum utilisation in an integrated theatre battle to pursue the national objectives.

METHODOLOGY

Justification of the Study

  1. National Security clearly tops the list of fundamental interests of any nation. These concerns with the protection, preservation and furtherance of the core values of a nation against both internal and external threats. A nation would react strongly to threats to its national interests using its national power. The elements of national power: politics, economy, diplomacy and military are required to be integrated in a manner that national aim and objectives are attained in unison. No element in itself can achieve the desired results. The military component, unless effectively integrated and joint as one entity, cannot be effectively employed achieving the national objectives and meeting the emerging security challenges to the nation in future.
  2. The war raging potential of any nation would not only be dependent on superior weapon platforms, weapons and a sound strategy but also upon the effective integration of all the forces in a theatre battlefield. This is amply demonstrated in the recent conflicts of Op Iraqi Freedom, Op Desert Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom. Those who believe that military matters can easily be categorised into land, sea and air, in our modern technologically agile world, are making a facile and anachronistic judgement. The Indian defence forces require restructuring to suit the modern technologically agile battle field. Therefore there is a need to study the requirement of evolving integrated theatre command in the Indian context where it faces threat not only from its adversaries but also internally.

Statement of Problem

  1. The present command structure of Indian Armed Forces is essentially service specific. Although some initiative has been taken to raise the joint command structures such as Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) and Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), yet there is long way to go for the Armed Forces to achieve jointness in the true sense of a theaterised battlefield. In view of the above, is there a requirement to reorganize the Armed Forces under the theaterised command structure to evolve them into an efficient and cohesive fighting unit to effectively meet the challenges of the future battlefield?

Hypothesis

  1. The evolution of Integrated Theaterised Command will enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of Armed Forces to function as a coherent and cohesive team in a theaterised battlefield.

Scope

  1. The study will concentrate on examining the emerging security challenges before the nation, the present command & field force structures, study different types of joint field force structures of various countries, analyze them to suggest a viable Integrated Theatre Commands based force structure to meet the emerging challenges to our national security.

Methods of Data Collection

  1. The study has entirely been conducted from the published books on the subject and articles & comments published in various journals available in the DSSC Library, Wellington. Also articles published and posted on internet sites of IDSA, USI, Indian Defence Review, India Strategic, CLAWS, Purple Pages etc have been studied and consulted on the given subject for the preparation of dissertation.

Preview

  1. The dissertation will be covered under following parts:-
  1. Chapter 1. Introduction.
  2. Chapter 2. Present Command Structure.
  3. Chapter 3. Need for Reorganisation.
  4. Chapter 4. Analysis of Foreign Armed Forces with Theaterised Command Structure.
  5. Chapter 5. Options for Restructuring Command Structure of Indian Armed Forces.
  6. Chapter 6. Recommendations.
  7. Chapter 7. Conclusion.

CHAPTER 2

PRESENT COMMAND STRUCTURE

  1. In today’s scenario, as seen above, our country is facing multi facet and multi directional security challenges. The onus of safeguarding the integrity and security of the nation lies on the shoulders of the Armed Forces. The Armed Forces are required to organize and train themselves to be able to meet any arising security threat to the nation. They are expected to guard the borders of the country, handle the internal security situation and any Out of Area Contingency (OOAC) task in both conventional as well as asymmetric scenarios. The current organization and structure of our armed forces have by now been able to tackle any such threat but there is a strong opinion to reorganise the armed forces as the nature of future emerging threats and security challenges are dynamic, multifarious and asymmetric.

Present Command Structure

  1. Pre Independence Background.Prior to independence the Governor General’s council was the highest decision making body in the Government of India. The Commander – in – Chief (C-in-C) was the supreme commander of all the three services of the Indian Armed Forces, who rendered single point military advice to the Governor General. The Defence Department, headed by the Defence Secretary was a civilian bureaucratic institution, distinct from the Army HQ and functioned directly under C-in-C. The Defence Department being subordinate to C-in-C could not scrutinise proposals from the three Service HQs. It was primarily a clearing house for issuing Government letters and Army, Navy and Air Force Instructions. This was the basic Higher Defence Organisation (HDO) inherited by India from the British at the time of independence.
  2. Post Independence Background.With the advent of independence, defence of free India became the responsibility of its elected government, the Defence Minister assumed full responsibility for the enunciation of the defence policy of the country and administration of her Armed Forces. During the period of Interim Government in 1946 – 47, the C-in-C was replaced by the Defence Minister in the Governor General’s Council and thereafter there was no military representative in this Council (Cabinet)[1]. The C-in-C’s responsibility was limited to control of the Armed Forces. The Department of Defence was enlarged suitably to take on such higher functions of threat estimation, accessed management of defence, force levels, budgeting, production and so on, which were attended to by Services Headquarters till then. It is here that the Armed Forces started losing their control over security issues, further amplified as under:-
    1. Status of Service Chiefs. The Services Chiefs were re-designated as Chiefs of Staff without any change in their responsibilities[2]. In fact, it is a misnomer to call the Services Chiefs in India as Chiefs of Staff because they do not function in that capacity. They still function as Cs-in-C of their Services. The administrative efficacy of the Service Chiefs was gradually reduced, to such extent where their recommendations to the Defence Minister were routinely sent for scrutiny and comments to the bureaucracy and would then slowly work their way upwards, through the hurdles of bureaucracy.
    2. Status of Services Headquarters. The three Services Headquarters were re-designated as Attached Offices of the Ministry of Defence. The Services Headquarters were subsequently reduced to adjuncts of Ministry of Defence and were placed completely outside.
  3. Structure of Operational Commands. The Indian Army is organised into six operational commands, the Northern Command (NC) at Udhampur, Western Command (WC) at Chandimandir, South Western Command (SWC) at Jaipur, Eastern Command (EC) at Kolkata, Southern Command (SC) at Pune & Central Command at Lucknow[3]. On the other hand, IAF currently has five op commands, namely Western Air Command (WAC) at Delhi, South Western Air Command (SWAC) at Gandhinagar, Southern Air Command (SAC) at Trivandrum, Central Air Command (CAC) at Allahabad & Eastern Air Command (EAC) at Shillong[4]. The Indian Navy is deployed under three area commands; Western Naval Command (WNC) at Mumbai, Southern Naval Command (SNC) at Kochi & the Eastern Naval Command (ENC) at Vishakhapatnam[5]. The operational commands of the three services are not co-located & further, the area of responsibility of the various commands of the Services is different and encompasses one or more commands of other Services. For example, the area of responsibility (AOR) covered by Western Air Command equates to the combined AOR’s of NC, WC and SWC of the Indian Army. The system so formed is disjointed and has somehow managed to deliver in the various wars fought by our nation. Lack of jointness in operations was clearly visible in most of the wars fought by the nation. For more than six decades the armed forces have delivered with this disjointed system as all three services worked in their own water tight compartments and finally it was Operation Vijay which initiated the thinking towards a much required change.
  4. Structure of the Defence Forces[6]. “The strength of the defence forces of India is approximately 15 lakh, with the army dominating with nearly 13 lakh personnel. The air force has strength of 140,000 and the navy fields approximately 55,000 personnel. There is a Territorial Army component of approximately 40,000.”
    1. Army. The Indian army is one of the largest standing army of the world, it comprises of thirteen Corps, three Armoured Divisions, four Reorganised Army plains Infantry Divisions (RAPID) in holding and strike roles, 18 infantry divisions and 10 mountain divisions, a number of independent brigades with requisite combat support and service support formations and units with one Mountain Strike Corps and requisite elements under raising. The organisational structure of the army is generally on traditional lines, heavily influenced as it has been by the erstwhile colonial British military. Although the Indian Army has shown its competence in conducting both conventional as well as Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) operations but changes are required for handling the asymmetric threat.
    2. Navy. The navy has 26 principal surface combatants, including two aircraft carriers; 49 patrol and coastal combatants and 16 submarines. The naval aviation has 35 combat aircraft and 97 helicopters. There is also Coast Guard with 52 patrol craft of various types. The plans for the modernisation are going at a rapid speed and soon it will have nuclear submarines and other elements to beef up its combat potential.
    3. Air Force. The air force fields approximately 680 combat aircraft, grouped in 32 fighter ground attack and six fighter squadrons; 40 armed helicopters grouped in three squadrons; 12 transport squadrons; 19 helicopter squadrons and miscellaneous squadrons covering tanker, maritime attack, electronic countermeasures, survey, VIP movement, training and so on. To be a potent force against our northern adversary its strength and equipment profile needs a drastic change and for that big ticket modernisation activities are on in air force.
  5. Kargil Review Committee : Defence Reforms.The Kargil disaster in 1999 led Government to appoint a committee named “Kargil Review Committee” (KRC). The findings of the committee pointed out glaring deficiencies in our intelligence services, border management, higher defence organisation and the national security system. The report made the following salient recommendations in the context of defence management:-
    1. To get rid of the notion that they did not take part in policy formation and were outside the government apex structure, SHQ be designated as ‘Integrated Headquarters’ instead of Attached Offices.
    2. Financial and administrative powers should be delegated to Service HQs and lower formations in order to expedite decision making and enhance their efficiency.
    3. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) should be strengthened by the addition of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and a Vice Chief of Defence Staff (VCDS).The CDS can be a four-star officer in rotation amongst the three Services and will be the permanent chairman of the COSC. He would fulfill the following functions:-
      1. Provide single point military advice to the government.
      2. Enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process through intra and inter-Services prioritisation.
      3. Administer the Strategic Forces.
      4. Ensure the required “Jointness” in the armed forces.[7]
  6. Joint Formations.As a result of the recommendations of the committee two joint formations and headquarters were established:-
    1. The Strategic Forces Command (SFC) and the Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC).
    2. HQ IDS. HQ IDS has been formed after merging the erstwhile Defence Planning Staff and the Joint Secretary (Military Wing). Headquarters IDS is required to support the Chief of Staff Committee (COSC) in optimal performance of their roles and functions. Headquarters IDS also controls integrated tri-services Andaman & Nicobar Command and Strategic Forces Command. The headquarters has representatives from the three Services, Ministry of External Affairs and Departments of Defence, Defence Finance and Defence Research and Development Organisation.
  7. Recent Developments. The government implemented some of the recommendations of Kargil Review Committee, however some of the major reforms including the appointment of a CDS were scuttled by the government. Off late due to pressure from the three Services and within, the Government constituted Naresh Chandra Committee in 2012 which recommended a permanent COSC in lieu of CDS. More recently Prime Minister during the Combined Commanders' Conference, Oct 13 approved formation of three new joint commands as under:-
    1. The Special Operations Command headed by a Lt General from the Army.
    2. The Aerospace Command headed by a Air Marshal from the Air Force.
    3. The Cyber Command headed by a Vice-Admiral from the Navy[8].

Limitations of Present Command Structure

  1. The present structure and system of functioning has several limitations and inadequacies which are highlighted briefly as under:-
    1. Lack of Integration.There is still a vast lack of integration within the three Services. This was evident during our wars against China and Pakistan owing to the compartmentalized performance of the three Services, each fighting its own war. The existing and proposed joint formations do address this problem, but partially.
    2. Inefficient Use of Defence Resources.The present system causes sub optimal utilisation of available funds and resources due to overlap and commonality within the three Services in many areas. There is a lack of centralised planning and prioritisation of equipment acquisition resulting in wastages of funds and duplication of procurement procedures. Thus, it leads to inefficient utilization of defence budget.
    3. Quality of Military Advice.Due to non implementation of post of CDS, there is lack of single point advice to Government on National security matters in a consolidated and holistic manner.
    4. Lack of Interoperability. Poor inter-operability within the Services has devoid us to achieve optimum results in any operation in today’s complex security environment a fusion of procedures at the tactical as well as operational levels is required to achieve the desired result in the available timeframe.
    5. Poor Joint Operations Capability. The three Services have meager joint operations capability due to lack of joint structures and training leading to resorting to adhoc arrangements for any conduct of joint operations. This does not produce optimal results desired and leads to mismanagement of resources.
    6. Inability to Handle Emerging Threats. Present force structures are not organized properly for handling multifarious threats arising in today’s and future security situation in an efficient manner. The same was evident in Kargil War and 26/11 in Mumbai.
    7. Functioning of Existing Joint Formations. The two joint formations formed after KRC Report have successfully come out from infancy stage and can serve as nucleus to develop any future joint field force organization. However, ANC and SFC after over ten years of existence and functioning under the HQ IDS have proved out to be of token service and suffer from few teething issues discussed as under :-
      1. Command & Control.The components of three Services suffer from dual reporting channel, one to the head of joint formation and other to the head of the parent Service. This creates functional problems and hinders independent decision making along with unwanted delays.
      2. Budgeting. For budgeting support the components of ANC & SFC have to depend upon parent Service whereas operationally they are under command the joint formation. Their requirements and operational roles are spelt out by the head of ANC/SFC, however for finances they have to look back to their parent service.
    8. Absence of CDS. The decision of Government not to create the post of CDS has taken the thunder out of KRC recommendations. The post of CDS would have ensured the required intra and inter-Service prioritization and the necessary “Jointness” in the Armed Forces in real terms thus enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the planning process. It would have been pivotal to creation and functioning of any future joint structure. The decision to go ahead with a permanent COSC seems to be a midway and ad hoc measure to address the issue of integration and jointness.

[1] http://idsa.in/jds/1_1_2007_IndiasHigherDefenceOrganization_aprakash (accessed on 09 Oct 2014)

[2] Ibid.

[3] World Defence Almanac, Mar 2014. P. 333.

[4] Ibid. P. 334.

[5] Ibid. P. 335.

[6] Ibid. P. 330 – 336.

[7]

Arun Prakash. National Security Reforms: Ten YearsAfter the Kargil Committee Report. USI National Security Lecture, 2012.p.5.

[8] World Defence Almanac, Mar 2014. P. 331.

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