Cost of direct warfare on states

DIRTY BUSINESS

Conducting direct warfare is a costly endeavor for a state. While warfare of the pre modern ages had usually involved troops in a limited area; modern warfare (wars like Thirty Years War, Napoleonic Wars, and World Wars) showed that wars are now involving the most of the population, bringing devastation to the countryside and resulting in massive losses even for the victorious side. Trying to solve a conflict with another country through force would mean an open declaration of war, paying for the maintenance of the troops and logistics, raised taxes and war weariness. States have also broader aims and enemies, being not just states; states might see armed groups, movements and ideologies as their enemies. Since, dealing with those enemies, be they states or non-state actors, by conducting warfare is costly as discussed; states might decide to support insurgencies or utilize armed non-state actors in order to achieve their aims while not getting directly involved.

But what are those aims, or better expressed, what are the motivations that the states support insurgencies or armed non-state actors? In his analysis paper “The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism” (2008) Daniel L, Byman indicates three main incentives that the states have when supporting armed groups: strategic motivations, ideological motivations and domestic political motivations. For the overt supporters, strategy matters the most as one would see in the case of Turkish support of the Free Syrian Army. For the covert or passive supporters, domestic politics matter as one would see in the case of Pakistan and its approval of presence of Taliban inside its borders. The organization has sympathizers in Pakistan (Qadri, 2009) and a reversal in policy would be costly for the Pakistani government. This paper accepts these aforementioned three motivations as main conditions for state support of armed groups and insurgents and will discuss them by providing historical and actual cases. Armed groups have proven to be prominent entities and tools for the states in the international and transnational arena and will stay so in the foreseeable future.

STRATEGIC MOTIVATIONS

Strategic motivations are still the main reasons for the states supporting armed groups and insurgents. Strategic motivations are the most important ones for the states supporting armed groups and insurgents because unlike the ideological and domestic political motivations, they are for reaching real benefits and achieving results for the state. Those motivations have a variety of aims:

Harming Rival States

Supporting an insurgency an armed group might result in the situation that the adversary state or alliance has to deal with one problem more. Insurgencies or armed groups can cause considerable damage to the economy, infrastructure, stability and military of the rival state. An example to this is the Russian support to the separatist insurgency in the eastern Ukraine. While Russia and Ukraine are not officially at war, since the Euromaidan protests and the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation, both countries have a hostile attitude towards each other. By supporting the separatists in the eastern Ukraine, Russia aims to keep Ukraine too unstable for NATO to align with (Eremenko, 2014) and forcing Ukraine to come to terms with Russia over the Crimean question.

Socio-Political Agenda

Armed groups can be effective when it comes to advance a socio-political agenda. In the article “Dissuading State Support of Terrorism: Strikes or Sanctions? (An Analysis of Dissuasion Measures Employed against Libya)” (Collins, 2004), it is mentioned that generating an atmosphere of fear and frightening broad segments of a society, seems to be a new phenomenon for introducing a new socio-political agenda. An example of this would be the Italian and Hungarian support to the Croatian Ustashe against France and Yugoslavia, the former being a supporter and the latter being a member of the Little Entente against Hungary and Italy. Ustashe took part in the assassination (1934) of the then Yugoslavian king Alexander I and the French foreign minister Louis Barthou (Collins, 2004, p. 2), both of whom were meeting in Marseille in order to discuss and reinforce their positions in the Little Entente.

Regional Influence

The situation in their neighbors has always been a source of concern for the states. Therefore, states might employ or support armed groups to keep the things fitting with their interests. Especially when there is the condition of a civil war and a possibility of a drastic change in its neighbor, a state might want to increase its influence by shaping the events and the result of the civil war. A good and up to date example for this would be the relationship between Turkey and the Free Syrian Army. By supporting the Syrian opposition and its fighting force Free Syrian Army; Turkey not only hopes to win favor with the faction that it thought would replace Assad, who is on bad terms with Turkey, but also intends increase its influence in order to keep the influence of other powers like Iran or Qatar away (Phillips, 2012, p. 138).

Security Cooperation

States might engage in mutual security arrangements with an armed group in order to gain influence in the respective group and utilize it for their security. These arrangements can be considered as mutual cooperation between the strong (state) and the weak (insurgents); benefiting the insurgents with money, weapons, training and shelter while the states would gain influence in the decision making process of the insurgents and gain a puppet army; both sides benefit as a result (Bapat, 2007, p. 4). During the Vietnam War; the commanders of the National Liberation Front and Viet Minh, groups that were operating in the rival South Vietnam, were under directions from the North Vietnamese government who was fighting against South Vietnam and the United States of America (Bapat, 2008, p. 5) and both groups acted as if they were forming the national army of the North Vietnam.

Power Projection

According to the Daniel L. Byman (2008), supporting armed groups gives weak states with big objectives influence outside their region. While the weak states, by their condition, cannot directly interfere in the events in a manner that a superpower like the United States can employ, their ties with armed groups might give them some maneuverability and influence outside their region. With this influence, states can frustrate their rivals’ intentions. Daniel L. Byman (2008) gives this example for the power projection dimension of the strategic motivations: Iran’s ties with Hezbollah and various Palestinian groups give Iran tremendous influence in the Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Lebanese arenas. That influence can be attested in the case of 2006 Lebanon War. Iran, together with Syria, had formed the circumstances which made the war possible and without Iranian military, training and financial aid, Hezbollah would never have emerged as a key power in Lebanon (Cordesman, 2007, p.61). This aid from Iran in order to hinder its rival, Israel, helped Hezbollah to resist to the IDF longer and better than what was expected from them.

Strategic Motivations: A Summary

Almost all strategic motivations to support armed groups and insurgencies can be summed up broadly as national interests or as a dimension of power politics. Rivalries between states, the competition to achieve more power and influence or achieving a political end give the states the reason to support armed groups and/or insurgents against rival countries. Especially in regions where the governments are not capable of exerting comprehensive authority, like Syria or Lebanon, armed groups are just as actors as the states are. Also, since an open warfare between states can be costly and devastating, employing armed groups reduce both the financial costs and social effects for the sponsor state. Unlike ideological motivations; strategic motivations most of the time include careful calculation, sound analysis, rational thinking and foresight.

IDEOLOGICAL MOTIVATIONS

States that are affiliated with an ideology can support armed groups or insurgencies against rival countries which fight for a cause similar to the worldview of the sponsoring country. Those ideologies might vary in their nature: Some are socio-economic ideologies; like capitalism, anti-communism or anti-imperialism and some are religious.

Socio-economic Ideologies

Socio-economic ideologies are the ones that have a broader view of the world, compared to the nationalist or religious views. For example; a religious fundamentalist government in a country might sympathize with a religious oriented armed group that follows the same religious belief in a rival country however, it might simply not care about other religious oriented groups in the worlds. A government that is affiliated with a socio-economic ideology is more likely to take an interest in a struggle happening somewhere in the world. During the cold war years, the United States vigorously adopted an anti-communist agenda and supported anti-communist armed groups and insurgencies around the world. An example of such would be the United States’ support of Mujahedeen in Afghanistan against its archrival during the Cold War, the Soviet Union. In order to oust Soviet Union from Afghanistan and prevent spreading of communism, the Reagan administration thought that supporting Islam fundamentalism and mujahedeen would be the best option to fight against communism since most of the secular movements in Muslim countries of that time embraced socialism (Powelson, 2003, p. 300).

Another case for socio-economic ideological motivation would be the “red” countries’ support of revolutionary or anti-imperialistic movements around the world. An example would be the Soviet support of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) against Israel. Since Israel was a staunch ally of the United States and the PLO’s biggest faction Fatah was a left-wing movement, Soviet Union began to support the PLO. The Soviet Union started to support a Palestinian state in 1974 and recognized the PLO as the representative of Palestinian people in 1978 (Golan, 1986, p. 285).

Religion

Having been a major element in international politics since the very ancient times, religion is still a source of conflict in many areas in the world. Armed groups with religious backgrounds constitute the majority of terrorist activities in Europe and Middle East. Many of the notorious and famous armed groups are religious; including the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL), Al-Qaeda, Hezbollah and so forth. Some countries are not secular. Some countries officially have a state religion (i.e. England: Anglicanism) and some countries have officially a religious form of government (i.e. Islamic republic). States with a strong religious influence in their practices often support armed groups and insurgencies that exist on a religious basis. Perhaps the most obvious case is the relationship between Iran and Hezbollah, both following the Shia denomination of Islam. While the relationship between both groups is nowadays based on mutual interests (see p. 4), the religious tie and the similarity of cosmology between the religious establishment of Iran (the Mullahs) and Hezbollah nevertheless stays strong. Firstly, they share the “Karbala Paradigm” as termed by Michael Fischer (1980). The classical Karbala story is that the Imam Hussein was killed by the Umayyad Caliphate. Followers of Hussein created the Shiism and Umayyad Caliphate has been affiliated with tyranny. In Iranian case, the oppressed are the masses and the oppressor (representing the Umayyad Caliphate) was the Shah and his regime while in Lebanese case the oppressed became the Hezbollah and the oppressor became the Israel and its ally the US (El Husseini, 2010, p. 805). Secondly, the movement that Hezbollah grew out of, Harakat al-Mahrumin (the Movement of the Deprived) a movement that was established by Musa al-Sadr, an Iranian priest (El Husseini, 2010, p. 806). And finally, the leaders of the Hezbollah have always stated their loyalty to the Supreme Leader of Iran (El Husseini, 2010, p. 809).

Ideology: A Summary

The end of the Cold War brought within a decline of the importance of ideology in the international politics. National interest and strategic decisions nowadays form the basis of states’ foreign policy decision. This has also affected the relations between states and their relationship with armed groups. Many regimes like Revolutionary Cuba, Khomeini era Iran, early years of Qaddafi Libya supported armed groups with an anti-Western agenda just because they thought it was the right thing to do however, it most of the time turned out to be costly as these regimes not only did not gain much but also faced international condemnation, sanctions, coup attempts and military strikes (Byman, 2008, p. 26). Libya supported the IRA out of anti-imperialism, even though Irish unification was not something very beneficial for it. Taliban before 9/11 allowed Al-Qaeda to grow in Afghanistan and attack the US even though before 9/11 there was not much hostility between the two respective governments and there was a risk (which became true after 9/11) of retaliatory attacks from the US. It can be said that regimes having strategic motivations rather than ideological motivations when supporting armed groups are more cautious and play their cards more rationally.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL MOTIVATIONS

The passive supporters of armed groups and insurgencies usually have domestic political motivations and concerns. Normally, the stance of the public opinion was not considered very important when it came to the strategic interests and ideological motivations. However, nowadays the prominence of the domestic political motivations is growing. States now also deal with public opinion when supporting or not supporting an armed group or insurgency. For example, the decision of Turkey for not intervening in the ISIL siege of Kobane caused a big uproar in the country’s considerable Kurdish minority. Apart from strategic motivations, Russian support to the rebels in Eastern Ukraine has also domestic political motivations. Putin’s approval rating has hit an impressive 86 percent due to the situation in Ukraine and his support to the rebels, who are being perceived as brave soldiers who are resisting fascist junta in Kiev (thanks to the massive propaganda by the Russian media), disowning them would destroy Putin’s popularity (Eremenko, 2014). Pakistan’s support, or benign neglect, for the Taliban, which enjoys a high popularity (Qadri, 2009), is approved nationwide and the government might may dearly for a reversal in the policy (Byman, 2008, p. 27). Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq in its region tolerates the existence of PKK, which is quite popular amongst both the Turkish and Kurdish Kurds and an alliance with Turkey and a crackdown would most definitely cause massive reactions from the Kurdish public on which, the KRG enjoys an accepted legitimacy and a high popularity.

Domestic Political Motivations: A Summary

While growing in significance, the domestic political motivations still lack behind in importance when compared with the strategic motivations. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, the public opinion can be shaped. Especially in the countries in which mass media is nationwide effective and/or the government control on media is high, shaping public opinion is possible. Secondly, there is no direct democracy in the world. Saying that, nearly every state is governed by a group of individuals, whether elected or not, who decide the courses of action. Sometimes this group, namely government, might decide that supporting or not supporting an armed group might be beneficial for the national interests even if it contradicts the people’s will. Since, the government has the last say, it might ignore public opinion.

WHY DO NOT ALL STATES SUPPORT INSURGENCIES OR ARMED GROUPS?

States might be hesitant when deciding to support an insurgency or an armed group. As making such a decision to support an insurgency or an armed group usually goes through detailed calculations, a risk assessment and sound analysis; states might not find it beneficial in the long term. Firstly, that support might backfire. The US supported the mujahedeen in Afghanistan however; those mujahedeen became the founders of the Al-Qaeda. Turkish government supported the Kurdish Hezbollah against PKK however, later on the organization committed many murders and as a result, Turkey had to crack down on it. Secondly, supporting an armed group or an insurgency might cause reactions from the international community especially if that group is considered a terrorist organization or the insurgency is considered illegitimate by the international community. Those reactions might vary: sanctions, condemnations, embargoes and so forth.

CONCLUSION

In the regions with weakening state authority, the armed groups are becoming prominent players however, this situation is not contradicting with the realist IR theory. Realists argue that the states are the only actors. And theories challenging realism often put forward the armed groups and insurgents as evidence that realism is becoming irrelevant. This is problematic. First, if a state is failing than it is no more considered a state in the realist sense. It is not capable of having the functions of the modern state. Second, when those armed groups become too powerful and take control the government, they establish the state again as one could see during the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War when the communists established the People’s Republic of China (arguably one of the most realist states in the world). As mentioned in end section of the first page, armed groups have proven to be prominent entities and tools for the states in the international and transnational arena and will stay so in the foreseeable future. That means that they will continue to play a role in the international arena however, they are mostly prone to be influenced and/or controlled by states.

REFERENCES

Bapat, N. A. (2007). The Sponsorship Dilemma: State Support for Militant Insurgency.

Byman, D. (2008). The Changing Nature of State Sponsorship of Terrorism. Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution.

Collins, S. D. (2004). Dissuading state support of terrorism: Strikes or sanctions?(An analysis of dissuasion measures employed against Libya). Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 27(1), 1-18.

Cordesman, A. H., & Sullivan, W. D. (2007). Lessons of the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war (Vol. 29, No. 4). CSIS.

El Husseini, R. (2010). Hezbollah and the axis of refusal: Hamas, Iran and Syria. Third World Quarterly, 31(5), 803-815.

Eremenko, A. (2014, July 21). Why Putin can’t afford to dump the Ukrainian Separatists. The Moscow Times. Retrieved from http://www.themoscowtimes.com/news/article/why-putin-can-t-afford-to-dump-the-ukrainian-separatists/503828.html

Fischer, M. M. (1980). Iran: From religious dispute to revolution. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press

Golan, G. (1986). The Soviet Union and the PLO since the War in Lebanon. Middle East Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2, 285-305.

Phillips, C. (2012). Turkey's Syria problem. Public Policy Research, 19(2), 137-140.

Powelson, M. (2003). US Support for Anti-Soviet and Anti-Russian Guerrilla Movements and the Undermining of Democracy. DEMOKRATIZATSIYA-WASHINGTON-, 11(2), 297-304.

Qadri, M. (2009, April 24). Why they love the Taliban. The Guardian. Retrieved from http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2009/apr/24/taliban-pakistan

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