Coup D'etat in Cote d'Ivoire

Less than two years after his assumption of power, there was a foiled coup⁴ and an insurrection with the rebel leaders citing the controversial elections which excluded Quattara as one of the reasons for their rebellion. In the ensuing political stand-off, the country was split in half with pro-Gbagbo elements controlling the southern part of the country and pro-Ouattara actors controlling the North.⁵ As part of a process of reunifying the country, a presidential election was held in 2010. Even though Gbagbo lost he refused to concede defeat to his opponent Ouattara and plunged the country into a constitutional crisis.

The President of the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC),⁶ the elections management institution of the country, proclaimed the provisional result of the second round on 2 December 2010. With a high turnout of more than 81%, candidate Ouattara garnered 54.10% of the votes, while candidate Laurent Gbagbo obtained 45.90%. Immediately following the release of the results, however, the head of Côte d'Ivoire's Constitutional Council proceeded to proclaim Mr. Gbagbo as the winner after having cancelled the results from some northern regions. According to this proclamation, candidate Gbagbo garnered 51.45% of the vote and candidate Ouattara 48.55%, with an overall participation rate of 71.28%.

On 4 December, both Mr. Gbagbo and Mr. Ouattara took oaths of office in Abidjan – Mr. Gbagbo before the Constitutional Council, and Mr. Ouattara through a letter addressed to the Constitutional Council, and each appointed cabinet members in their governments. ⁷

3.1.2 The AU’s Reaction

At a meeting of the African Union Peace and Security Council, an International Working Group (IWG)was formed on October 6, 2006.In addition, the AU decided that Gabgbo should remain Head of State from of a new transition government not exceeding twelve months. These decisions were endorsed by a UN Security Council Resolution 1633.⁹The IWGs¹⁰ mission was to evaluate and follow the transition in Cote d’Ivoire and provide the Ivorian government the assistance necessary for continuing the peace process. In connection with this South African President, Thabo Mbeki led the IWG mediation teamto enhance the peace process and the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis¹¹ and the Accra¹²agreements, the latter being the road map for the implementation of the Linas-Marcoussis.

These efforts did not yield a peaceful resolution of the crisis.¹³ From November 2010 to April 2011, more than 3000 civilians were killed. Hundreds of thousands of Ivoirians were either internally displaced or crossed the borders of Liberia to the east and Ghana to the west as refugees. In the ensuing anarchy that was engulfing the country, the pro-Ouattara armed groups attacked Abidjan. The killings and reprisal killings brought the country on the brink of collapse and mass atrocities. Fearing the worse outcome, the UN Secretary General through the Chief of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (the UNOCI)with the endorsement of ECOWAS requested air asset combat support from the French Licorne.¹⁴ As the impasse deepened, Laurent Gbagbo went into hiding in a bunker in a presidential residence. The UN and French forces unleashed relentless attacks on the Presidential residence that facilitated the capture of Gbagbo by the pro-Ouattara forces who eventually placed him under the protective mandate of the UN contingent in the country.

The CAR is a landlocked country in the centre of the African continent with boundaries connecting with Cameroon to the west, Chad and Sudan to the north, and the Republic of Congo and the Democratic Republic of Congo to the south.Unlike La Cote d’ Ivoire which was relatively prosperous and politically stable at the dawn of its political implosion, the CAR had grappled with the challenges of political instability since independence.¹⁵ The latest episode which ended with the institution of a fragile democratic system began with an insurrection staged by the Seleka Movement. When the latter over ran the state, it was worse than a failed state: it had become virtually a phantom state, lacking any meaningful institutional capacity. ¹⁶ The CAR’s status as a phantom state resulted from ethno power struggles having crept in to its political arena in the aftermath of a 1981 elections which brought General Kolingba¹⁷ to power. During his tenure (1981-1993), political opposition between southerners and northerners crystallized and this was later buttressed by Ange-Félix Patassé. Kolingbaadopted a policy of placing his friends and members of his own ethnic group (the Yakoma) at the head of strategic institutions of defence, security, the civil service and state-owned companies. Hence at the start of the 1990s, the presidential guard of the CAR was mainly made up of the Yakoma. Members of that group were at the head of twenty-nine of thirty-six state-owned and mixed companies. His successors also played the ethnic card and did not shy-away from stirring up conflicts in order to take control of state resources and harness them for their personal benefit or for that of their respective ethnic groups.

When Patassé¹⁸ inherited the reins of power from Kolingba, he repeated the same strategy of politics adopted by Kolongba only this time with a different set of actors. First, he sought to guarantee his personal security by transferring or expelling the Yakoma from the Presidential Guard. This aroused discontent among those concerned, who had been given preferential treatment under the former government. He then created a new presidential security force: an ethnic militia exclusively made up of the Sara-Kaba, the new head of state’s northern ethnic “family”.

In the context of the political tension that had been set up, a series of mutinies triggered off political instability. This then evolved into the Seleka Movement who eventually over ran the country. The atrocities committed in the civil war has been tagged as ethnic cleansing.¹⁹

In the initial stages of the Seleka insurrection, the African Union (AU) attempted to address the situation without international assistance.²⁰Its initial effort came through the establishment of the Mission for the Consolidation of Peace in Central African Republic (MICOPAX) upon the conclusion of the first Libreville Summit in October 2002. By 2008, MICOPAX had become the responsibility of the Economic Community of Central African States, or ECCAS. That same year, in response to increasing violence throughout the country, the AU also decided to send troops from the Multinational Force of Central Africa (FOMAC) into the CAR. However, the FOMAC troops were eventually overwhelmed by the Seleka violence that followed Djotodia’s installation as president in 2013.

In the light of this development, on 10 October 2013, the Security Council met to amend the mandate of BINUCA²¹, -a UN field office in the CAR- which has sought to help consolidate peace, foster national reconciliation, and strengthen democratic institutions, as well as strengthen the promotion and protection of human rights. The said meeting also requested the UN Secretary-General to report to the Security Council within thirty days on his plans for the creation of an African-led International Support Mission in the CAR (known alternatively as AFISMA-CAR), and plans for the possible option of transforming AFISMA-CAR into a United Nations peacekeeping operation. In addition, Resolution 2121²² further underscored the primary responsibility of the Central African authorities to protect the population.

On 15 November 2013, in compliance with the Security Council’s aforementioned request from October, the Secretary-General reported on five options for international support in the CAR. These options included: providing bilateral/multilateral support to AFISMA-CAR; establishing a UN Trust Fund for assistance; creating a limited UN support package funded through assessed and voluntary contributions; implementing a comprehensive UN support package funded through assessed contributions; and, finally, transforming AFISMA-CAR into a UN peacekeeping operation. As such, on 5^th December, 2013, the Security Council adopted Resolution 2127²³which was based on the belief of the UN Security Council members that a UN peacekeeping operation was both the inevitable and most viable solution.

The AU was not happy about this development because it wanted to try out its own independent peacekeeping force (AFISMA-CAR) first.²⁴ In line with this determination, two days later, on 7 December, the AU announced that it would increase its troop levels to 6,000. France also decided to deploy 1,600 troops to the CAR for six months, as authorized under Resolution 2127. The French mission, known as Operation Sangaris , agreed to work alongside African troops and assist efforts to disarm rebel factions throughout the CAR.On 19^thDecember 2013, the AU subsequently authorized the deployment of 3,600 troops under the auspices of AFISMA-CAR, which effectively took over from MICOPAX.

1. The Darfur Crisis

Darfur, located in the west of Sudan, is comprised of about ninety different ethnic groups, with non-Arabs engaging mostly in crop farming, and Arabs engaging mostly in livestock.²⁵Darfur²⁶, since the independence of the Sudan has been left out of national politics, and used as a space for cheap labour and soldier recruitment. In 1971, Arabs from northern Sudan were sent to Darfur to administer the government. In the 1980s there were land disputes, caused in part by environmental changes including drought and desertification, and violent conflict erupted between farmers and nomads, both of whom were affected by drought. Darfur began militarizing. The restructuring of governance systems in the 1990s gave Darfuri Arabs control of the region, and, in a fight to control land for their livelihoods, the farmers’ homes were torched. Fed up with their disenfranchisement and heartened by the movement for independence in south Sudan, some Darfuris took action. In 2000, an anonymous publication called the Black Book²⁷ was spread, showing that riverine Arabs (from the area surrounding the Nile near Khartoum) from north Sudan, though constituting only five percent of the population, consistently maintained sixty to eighty percent of ministerial positions in the Sudanese government. The book was written in part by Khalil Ibrahim from the Zaghawa ethnic group and supporter of al Bashir’s arch rival, Hannah al Turabi.²⁸ The ruling National Congress Party (NCP), afraid that it will lose power prepared to fight in Darfur. As the government ratcheted up its military campaigns against the non-Arab Darfuris, they had no other choice than to defend themselves.

Meanwhile two groups-the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)²⁹ mounted a joint attack on a government base in Darfur and the NCP in reaction recruited landless Arabs into a militia called the Janjaweed (meaning “devil on horseback”),³⁰ whom they armed and tasked with quelling the rebellion, focusing on the ethnic groups of the Fur, Massalit, and Zaghawa peoples. Villages were looted and destroyed, men killed, women and girls systematically raped, homes set afire, and survivors chased into the desert.By mid-2005an estimated of 170,000 lives have been lost and more than two million Darfurians have been internally displaced or driven into neighbouring Chad.Given the gravity of the tool on human lives, Darfur has become synonymous with genocide,³¹ though many in the international community have been reluctant to describe the situation there in such terms.

3.3.1 The AU’s Response

As the violence in Darfur continued into 2004, the African Union sent a small mission to Darfur with UN Security Council endorsement to monitor a cease-fire agreement between the rebels and Khartoum. This mission eventually evolved into the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS).³² Alongside the AMIS was mediation efforts led by President Idris Dèby of Chad. This culminated in the first ceasefire agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SLA in September 2003. But growing tensions between Sudan and Chad ended the latter’s role in the peace process. The hostility between the two countries came to a head in 2008 with rebel advances on their respective capitals.Meanwhile, the peace talks continued apace under the auspices of the AU, culminating two years later in the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA),³³ between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Armay led by Mini Minnawi. Signed on 6^th May, 2006, the DPA faced serious challenges from its inception primarily because it was a partial agreement that did not enjoy the support of the two other parties in the conflict - the JEM and the SLA. These two ended up not signing it. Despite these challenges, the AU established the DPA Implementation Team (DPAIT)³⁴ with a mandate to spearhead implementation of the agreement. The DPAIT was to work closely with the chairperson of the Darfur Dialogue and Consultation (DDC). The DDC was to address issues ranging from security, claims of marginalisation and exclusion and socio-economic development to reconciliation.

For its part, the PSC endorsed the DPA and set a deadline for the non-signatories to sign up or face sanctions.The JEM and the SLA failed to comply, forcing the PSC to impose targeted sanctions including a travel ban and asset freeze of the leadership of the factions.³⁵The growing insecurity and additional mandated tasks from the DPA served as strong arguments for a transition from AMIS to a UN force. The under resourced AU peacekeepers had proved incapable of addressing the mounting security problems. Consequently, the PSC decided on a transition from AMIS to a UN operation, within the framework of the partnership between the AU and the United Nations. However, it stressed that this transition should take place only with the consent of the Government of Sudan and on the understanding that the African character of the UN mission would be maintained, including its composition and leadership.As the debate on transition continued, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1706³⁶ expanding the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) to include deployments in Darfur.